

Knowledge and Knowers

Abstract This chapter recounts the development of Legitimation Code Theory (LCT), placing it in a lineage of work in the sociology of education. It outlines the four dominant specialisation codes of knowledge legitimation and transmission, before focusing in particular on the *élite code*. This code typically specialises learning and teaching in drama; a case supported by an analysis of the NSW Drama syllabus. The arguments and findings of the chapter are supported by two case studies: the first drawn from operation of a contemporary Australian University; and the second drawn from a fictional representation of a University.

2.1 A SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Almost all contemporary work within the sociology of education is underpinned by the vast corpus of writing by Basil Bernstein. Across the five volumes of his seminal work *Class, Codes and Control* (1971–2000), Bernstein theorised education as a comprehensive set of understandings about both knowledge and pedagogic discourse. According to Karl Maton:

Bernstein outlines the trajectory of his work as a movement from the analysis of the pedagogic transmission and acquisition of existing knowledge within educational contexts, through a theory of construction of the pedagogic discourse being transmitted and acquired, to the study of the knowledge subject to such pedagogic transmission (2004: 219).

In part, this identifies the origin of much of this work in the relationship between the high school curriculum in the UK and that country's particularly embedded class system. Bernstein's work emerged at a time when the larger numbers of so-called Baby Boomers were moving through secondary and tertiary education, many imbued with a sense of radicalism carried over from the student protests of the late 1960s (for a longer potted history, see Moore 2009). The insistence, therefore, on the social dimensions of education is a result of a perceived lack of interest on the part of traditional sociology in considering how these broader social forces manifest in education.

The social and historical factors in the study of education, elements characteristically emphasised in the "new" sociology of education and claimed as its mark of distinction from earlier developments in the discipline, are encapsulated by Bernstein's *pedagogic device*. This Bernstein defines as "the means whereby [agents] are able to regulate the principles and social bases of the distribution, recontextualisation and evaluation of pedagogic discourse" (Maton 2004: 219; cf. Bernstein 1990: 165–218). Control of this *pedagogic device* becomes of crucial importance in knowledge transmission. As Maton and Johan Muller assert, "[Bernstein's] theory aimed not only to bring together power/knowledge/consciousness but to place this within an account of cultural and social reproduction, transformation and change" (Maton and Muller 2007: 19–20). Bernstein argues that those agents in control of the pedagogic device are most capable of setting the measure of success in the field, making control of the device a key step in legitimating knowledge. This is also where his theory has been taken up to support arguments about the symbolic control and domination of knowledge.

The domination referred to above takes place because the agent in control of the pedagogic device can wield it to set the terms of pedagogic discourse. In other words, whoever is able to control the terms of achievement in a particular system is able to set the terms in which teaching and learning in that system is discussed. This speaks to the concern raised in Chap. 1: as creative arts teachers have rarely been in control of the pedagogic device, our pedagogies have often been seen as inferior.

Later in his career Bernstein asserted that the "new" sociology of education had

rarely turned its attention to the analysis of the intrinsic factors constituting and distinguishing the specialised form of communication realised by the pedagogic discourse of education (1990: 165).

The argument, then, follows that the analysis of contemporary social, historical, and cultural conditions and their relations *to* education, which had been encouraged by his early work needed to be matched by an analysis of “relations within” pedagogic discourse (Bernstein 1990: 165). In addition, as Maton and Muller argue, “while the pedagogic device was the condition for the construction of pedagogic discourse[,] what was still required was to address the forms this discourse might take” (Maton and Muller 2007: 22). In his final contributions to the sociology of education, Bernstein set about addressing what he had identified as this disciplinary blind spot. In so doing, he delineated a new field, which has come to be referred to as the sociology of knowledge. The resulting collection of interdisciplinary concerns has profoundly influenced this book.

Bernstein begins by distinguishing between *horizontal discourse* and *vertical discourse*. The geometrical metaphor in these categories relates to the connections between the various knowledges that make up each pedagogic discourse: horizontal knowledges are “related not by integration of their meanings by some co-ordinating principle, but through the functional relations of segments or contexts to everyday life” (Bernstein 1999: 160). Horizontal discourse thus refers to common-sense, context-specific knowledges where the situation in which the knowledge is performed is what matters. Horizontal discourses are more present within “face-to-face relations with a strong affective loading as in the family, peer group or local community” (Bernstein 1999: 161). The pedagogic process in a horizontal discourse is often no longer than a single context, and is directed towards learning a common competence rather than towards graded performance. This is opposed to vertical discourse, which “takes the form of a coherent, explicit and systematically principled structure” (Bernstein 1999: 159). That is, vertical discourse is concerned with the hierarchical relations of knowledges in which abstract principles underpin the performance of knowledge. It is for this reason that vertical discourses are predominant within institutional pedagogies. Bernstein takes care to insist that agents in any particular field often move between the two discourses. He further clarifies the distinction by moving away from what he sees as a tendency to divide knowledge into unequally valued binaries—local/official knowledge, for example, or everyday/school knowledge (Bernstein 2000: 156).

In order to provide a more nuanced model, Bernstein proposes two further categories within vertical discourse. He distinguishes between a *horizontal knowledge structure* and a *hierarchical knowledge structure*. The

former is defined as a “series of specialised languages with specialised modes of interrogation and criteria for the construction and circulation of texts” (Bernstein 1999: 162). The term “languages” might be more profitably thought of as “knowledges” to avoid terminological confusion; Bernstein refers here to the discrete knowledge sets that make up a discipline. These languages sit side by side in a horizontal structure, and they do not necessarily overlap, as illustrated by Fig. 2.1. Progress can be made within the knowledge structure only by the addition of a new language, which sits alongside its inward-looking colleagues.

Within a discipline characterised by a *horizontal knowledge structure*, new knowledge is presented as a new or radical approach, which constructs the world in a way un contemplated by other languages. So, for example, a teacher might use phrases like “forget everything you’ve learnt before”, or “this subject isn’t like any others”. The new language may well draw upon or adapt features of those languages which preceded it, but the authority of the discipline area is drawn from the uniqueness of its language. As Maton and Muller put it, “in horizontal knowledge structures acquirers are faced with an array of languages based on different, often opposed assumptions” (2007: 24). The original conception of Drama in the NSW school syllabus is a useful example here: it was presented as a radical departure from the English curriculum that preceded it. The differing ways of examining texts written for performance proposed by each discipline were seen as irreconcilable.

A *hierarchical knowledge structure*, on the other hand, refers to “a coherent, explicit and systematically principled structure, hierarchically organised” (1999: 161). This structure is characterised by integration, where new knowledges envelop previous ones, expanding their capabilities and thus “building an apex of greater integrating propositions” (Maton and Muller 2007: 23). Intellectual progress can be characterised in a vastly different manner in a hierarchical knowledge structure, because




Fig. 2.1. Horizontal Knowledge Structure, illustrating different sets of knowledges with different shades of grey

the driving aim is streamlining: taking the image of the triangle illustrated by Fig. 2.2, then new knowledges within the structure are designed to “widen the base and sharpen the tip” (Maton and Muller 2006: 24). This form, according to Bernstein, is best embodied by the natural sciences, in which fewer theoretical constructs are sought which embrace and explain a wider range of phenomena.

In a discipline characterised by a *hierarchical knowledge structure* the focus is on uniting the various knowledges found throughout the field, rather than teaching one set of knowledge to the exclusion of others. The discipline might argue that through the integration of a wide array of languages, more of the world can be understood. The authority of the discipline area is thus drawn from its ability to contain and explain the widest range of events. This accords with Bernstein’s description of progress within *hierarchical knowledge structures*: “the passage from one theory to another does not signal a break in the language; it is an extension of its explanatory/descriptive powers” (1999: 164). A useful example here is the discipline of mathematics, in which the curriculum throughout secondary schooling is constantly building students’ skills so that they have more methodologies available to them to solve a particular problem. Following Bernstein, we can therefore employ the categories of *horizontal* and *hierarchical knowledge structures* when describing any particular vertical discourse.

Within the commentary on and explanation of Bernstein’s theory, and to a lesser but nonetheless noticeable degree in the original work, there is an implicit valuing of the stability offered by *hierarchical knowledge structures*.




Fig. 2.2. Hierarchical Knowledge Structure, illustrating different sets of knowledges with different shades of grey

This arises from a distinctive feature of *horizontal knowledge structures* as outlined by Bernstein; that “the capacity to create knowledge that builds on and goes beyond existing knowledge is limited” (Maton and Muller 2007: 24). This is because any set of new knowledge must reject its predecessors outright, and propose something entirely new. Disciplines characterised by a horizontal knowledge structure are therefore vulnerable to sharp changes both in trend and demand, and often fall victim to schism or radical breaks. Some of Maton’s early work characterised the humanities in general, and Cultural Studies in particular, as predominantly *horizontal knowledge structures*, and argued that this had limited their disciplinary evolution.

As opposed to the natural sciences, where steady progress can be ensured by a hierarchical knowledge structure, an extreme view of the humanities would suggest that progress is impeded by regular schism and justification of new sets of knowledges. An overriding consideration here then is that these two structures do not necessarily exist as a dichotomy: traces of different knowledge structures can exist in the same field. Willmar Sauter, writing about the field of theatre and performance studies, also reminds us that the same field can be characterised in different ways, and that there is a degree of disciplinary prowess involved in staking out these fields: the delineating of a field is “a struggle for dominant position [...] by expanding the borders of the field, old positions have to be redefined and new power relations are established” (Sauter 2000: 36). Depending on who is doing the defining and for what purpose, then, radically different readings of fields can be produced.

In particular, Maton and Muller note that it is possible for individual languages within a horizontal structure to display some of the features of hierarchical structures, making them “mini-triangles”. As I noted above, they often embrace common terms and may build on some of the insights of previous knowledges. The key difference in this case is that the “authors are not speaking the same language—their assumptions and criteria for legitimate knowledge claims are different” (Maton and Muller 2007: 26). Additionally, while we could expect to see integration of previous knowledges within a language, what differentiates hierarchical from horizontal knowledge structures is what Maton and Muller describe as “the capacity for such development *across* languages” in the former (2007: 26, emphasis in original). Bernstein also differentiates the two on the basis of their strength of “grammar”, or the extent to which they demonstrate “an explicit conceptual syntax capable of ‘relatively’ precise empirical

descriptions and/or of generating formal modelling of empirical relations” (Bernstein 1999: 164). In other words, *hierarchical knowledge structures* can have more or less descriptive and explanatory power according to their grammar strength. Within sets of knowledges exhibiting a stronger grammar, new knowledge can be evaluated with reference to whether it delivers stronger results than the existing sets. In weaker grammars of horizontal knowledge structures, “relations between languages or segments cannot be settled by empirical research and are confined to critique” (Maton and Muller 2007: 27). Bernstein also proposes that some horizontal knowledge structures exhibit traces of hierarchical structures in their relatively stronger grammars.

In order to illustrate this perhaps convoluted description, let us return to a practical example. Imagine a Drama teacher is creating an assessment task in which a student has to direct a scene. The knowledges within the discipline area, for those unfamiliar with it, often employ similar vocabulary and concepts (as explored further later in this study). However, each particular knowledge set valorises these terms and ideas differently. For example, character motivation, which plays a key role in trainings drawn from the Stanislavskian tradition, is almost completely disregarded in Practical Aesthetics. If this teacher were teaching in a horizontal knowledge structure—as is the case with the majority of conservatoire-based training—the assessment task could be expected to emphasise the particular usage and definition of these terms within one system, to the exclusion of all others. The criteria for achievement could conceivably assess, for example, how effectively a student utilised the tools of this one system in order to direct a particular scene. On the other hand, an assessment task where the teaching is characterised by a hierarchical knowledge structure might attempt to synthesise elements of the many different knowledge sets within the field. It could examine differing approaches to practice, for example: looking at how Viewpoints and Practical Aesthetics might approach the solving of a similar textual or staging challenge. The aim of such a synthesis would be to enable student directors to produce new results, while retaining those offered by each system discretely. “In other words, the new integrating theory includes but goes beyond its predecessors”, thereby demonstrating the stronger grammar of this knowledge structure (Maton and Muller 2007: 27). Criteria for achievement in this second task could assess how comprehensively a student synthesises tools from the languages at their disposal in order to effectively direct a scene.

2.2 LEGITIMATION CODE THEORY

In developing Bernstein's sociology of education, Rob Moore and Karl Maton emphasise the ways in which knowledge is legitimated, rather than focusing further on the structures and discourses inherent in that knowledge. In particular, this book is concerned with examining Maton's development of what he calls Legitimation Code Theory (LCT). This addresses two key concerns: what counts as legitimate knowledge in the field; and who can legitimately make claims in this regard? LCT is driven by examining what Moore calls

the key relationship [...] between the manner in which knowledge has developed within an intellectual field and the manner in which individuals become members, of how it is that, as Bourdieu puts it, the scientist becomes the scientific field 'made flesh' (2009: 145).

In order to investigate this driving question, Maton develops a framework of legitimation codes. What follows in this section is a brief introduction to some of the most compelling parts of the framework.

Maton begins by "conceiving of educational knowledge as having two (co-existing but analytically distinct) sets of relations, highlighting that knowledge claims are simultaneously claims to knowledge *of the world* and *by authors*" (Maton 2000: 154, emphasis in original). These two relations he goes on to describe as the *epistemic relation*, the relationship between the knowledge and the object(s) of study, and the *social relation*, the relationship between the knowledge and the author or subject of that knowledge. According to Maton, this equates broadly to *what* can legitimately be described as knowledge in any particular field, and *who* can legitimately claim to be producing this knowledge within the field. These relations can be strong or weak within any particular code, and Maton offers us vocabulary for describing each of the possibilities provided by the model. This produces what he describes as "four potential legitimation codes, of which [the first] two were identified as predominant within extant intellectual fields" (Maton 2004: 220):

- the *knowledge code* (strong epistemic relation, weak social relation);
- the *knower code* (weak epistemic relation, strong social relation);
- the *elite code* (strong epistemic relation, strong social relation);
- and
- the *relativist code* (weak epistemic relation, weak social relation).

Across the decade of his work published on this topic, Maton offers some quite comprehensive descriptions of the differing codes and how they might function, summarised below.

The knowledge code is characterised by its epistemic relation, and fields exhibiting this code “are legitimated by reference to specialised procedures that are claimed to provide unique knowledge of a specialised, discrete ontological object of study” (Maton 2000: 156). In this code, then, there is a sanctioned object of knowledge which can be distinguished from those studied in other fields, and a sense the agents who control this field can determine what is an appropriate object of study (and of course what is not). At the same time, the social relation can be considered relatively weak because “everyone is said to be equally positioned in relation to the educational knowledge and practices of the field, and (it is claimed) anyone can produce knowledge” (Maton 2000: 156). That is, what you know is far more important than who you are. Contested knowledge claims must therefore engage with the object of study itself: new voices can be heard as long as they accept and interact with the previous established discursive field.

On the other hand, “knower codes of legitimation base claims for fields on a privileged object of study, the ‘knower’” (Maton 2000: 156). They are therefore specialised by the social relation; that is they are legitimated by “personal characteristics of the author or subject” (Maton 2000: 155). Unlike the knowledge code, which has a tightly bounded set of appropriate objects of study, in the knower code knowers can claim unique knowledge of a potentially endless set. As Maton notes, the “adjudication of competing knowledge claims on strictly ‘intellectual’ grounds is deemed problematic, if not directly renounced”, thereby displaying the code’s weak epistemic relation (2000: 156). At the same time, claims are legitimated by reference to subjective experience or characteristics on the part of the knower. The social relation is therefore relatively strong, because “the aim is to ‘give voice’ to this experiential knowledge, with ‘truth’ being defined by the ‘voice’” (Maton 2000: 157).

In part, there is an implicit practice/theory divide here. That is, the *knower code* is perceived to give voice to practical knowledge usually discounted in traditional theoretical knowledge frameworks. There are many compelling examples of this effect, from celebrity chefs to climate change scientists, some of whom even go so far as to discredit the epistemic relation entirely in order to assert the “inability of existing educational knowledge to articulate the voice of this previously silenced knower” (Maton

2000: 161). This also means that any claims to new knowledge must contest the right of a knower to speak on the subject, making knower codes inherently more unstable because “the unique knowledge is specialised to the privileged knower such that actors with different subjective characteristics are unable to make claims about this knowledge” (Maton 2000: 157).

Maton has explored the *élite* and *relativist* codes far less comprehensively, perhaps suggesting that they occur less frequently in the early studies which developed LCT. These studies were concerned with tertiary education in the UK, concentrating on the emergence of cultural studies as a distinct field of study. In brief, teaching and learning in the *relativist code* occurs where “legitimate identity and insight is ostensibly determined by neither knowledge nor dispositions” (Maton 2007: 98). I will not outline this code any further, as I believe it has little relevance to a study of the field of higher education. This is primarily, I would suggest, linked to assessment frameworks with which contemporary HEPs must conform—without any “strong” relation in the field, there is no measure by which to judge achievement. A field exhibiting the *relativist code* would therefore be a practical impossibility at a tertiary level, although it is worth noting that searching for such an extreme case (i.e. an *entirely* relativist code) might be fruitless in all four of the codes.

Finally, fields displaying the *élite code* of knowledge legitimisation exhibit specialisation in both the epistemic and the social relation; that is “where legitimacy is based not only on possessing specialist knowledge but also being the right kind of knower” (Maton 2007: 98). Maton offers a case study of music at a high school level in the UK, revealing that perceived success in this area was related not only to the knowledge of a specialised set of material, but also in having a “taste, judgement or a developed ‘feel’ for it” (Maton 2007: 101). Perhaps the more compelling example is that of the gentleman scientist of the Enlightenment: it was not enough to be engaged in legitimate research into a sanctioned area, but the scientist had to be from the right social class for the findings to be accepted as legitimate contributions to knowledge (Maton 2007: 98). To return to the vocabulary offered above, it mattered both who the gentleman scientist was *and* what he knew. This study will go on to explore the *élite code* in detail from Sect. 2.4, but even this brief example suggests that, given the implicit standards of taste which are being promulgated, the pedagogic device gains even more crucial importance.

These descriptions of different codes of knowledge are underpinned by what Maton has elsewhere called “languages of legitimisation”. Such

languages “represent claims made by actors for carving out and maintaining intellectual and institutional spaces within education, i.e. the proclaimed *raison d'être* that provides the condition of existence for intellectual fields” (Maton 2000: 149). That is, the code in which knowledge is sanctioned constitutes the field itself by delineating areas of common concern. The codes that LCT outlines provide a framework for understanding how new knowledge comes about, and how it is legitimated. The Theory is therefore concerned with the same kinds of questions with which this book began. In asking teachers to consider what material they teach and how they talk about it, I am also asking *what is to count as knowledge*.

2.3 LCT AND KNOWLEDGE TRANSMISSION

While legitimation codes indicate the relationship between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge, another of Moore and Maton’s important theoretical contributions considers the ways in which that knowledge is imparted. Drawing on the basic principles and vocabulary of LCT outlined in Sect. 2.2, this section will introduce three related ideas which focus on codes that specialise knowledge transmission: Maton’s concept of the epistemic device; the knower codes of students; and the dominant orientation of teaching.

As an overarching part of LCT, Moore and Maton propose an “epistemic device”, which operates in concert with Bernstein’s pedagogic device as outlined above. This device is “the means whereby intellectual fields are maintained, reproduced, transformed and changed. Whoever controls the epistemic device possesses the means to set the structure and grammar of the field in their own favour” (Maton 2004: 220). Control of the device becomes important because, as Moore and Maton note, “any specific intellectual field is organised in such a way as to make certain things visible and potential objects for knowledge, and other things invisible within its current field of vision” (Moore and Maton 2001: 157). The agent(s) responsible for that arrangement are therefore able to alter the languages of legitimation at play in the field to privilege what they see as acceptable objects of study and knowledge. “In other words, control of the device is access to a ruler and distributor of legitimate claims to new knowledge, legitimate membership of the field (professional identity), legitimate practices and so forth” (Moore and Maton 2001: 161). Maton argues that the epistemic device affects the relationships between institutions, teachers and learners. This epistemic device is “an analogue of

the ‘pedagogic device’”, and the exact difference between them is still to be explored in further studies (Moore and Maton 2001: 176). However, the basic distinction is that while the pedagogic device controls the fields of knowledge recontextualisation and reproduction, the epistemic device controls the field of knowledge production. “The epistemic device regulates who can produce legitimate knowledge, the ways in which antecedent knowledge is selected and transformed in the course of producing new knowledge, and the criteria for adjudicating claims to new knowledge” (Moore and Maton 2001: 176).

One of the case studies which Maton offers of the *Realpolitik* of the epistemic device is entitled “The wrong kind of knower” (2004), which discusses the spectre of the “new student” in 1960s UK at a time when the higher education industry anticipated rapid expansion. In it, he argues that the “new student”, with her focus on the pragmatic outcome of university study, was said to pose a problem for the dominant specialisation codes of knowledge at traditional universities. “While past students were said to owe their position, identity and allegiance to their membership of the university, scholastically minded new students would, it was alleged, focus on their knowledge of the discipline” (Maton 2004: 224). The mythical “new student”—who Maton alleges never arrived—was therefore operating within the *knowledge code*, expecting access to a sanctioned set of knowledge, while the institutions maintained a dominant *knower code* orientation. (Indeed, I would be tempted to go further than Maton does and argue that universities like Oxford and Cambridge at least were operating in a dominant *élite code* orientation, where it matters both what you know and who you are.) In this example then, Maton outlines how some institutions utilised their control of the epistemic device to maintain a dominant orientation to teaching that matched that of the students they wished to attract. Other institutions, attempting to avoid the influx of these differently coded students, in turn used their control of the epistemic device to position their programmes as unattractive.

To take a more contemporary example, some of the same ideas are at play within the contemporary Australian push to encourage more students from low socio-economic (LSE) backgrounds to attend university in order to improve future employment opportunities. This forms a key part of the strategic plan of, for example, the University of Sydney, and doubtless other institutions around the country. As part of this drive, institutions are rethinking their code modality, and using their control of the epistemic device to shift it to match that of these potential students.

Unlike the students who have come before them, these students don't see tertiary education as the logical next step in and of itself, but need rather to be assured of the real-world knowledges to which they will be granted access—the assumption behind this thinking appears to be that these new students have an eye on their employability rather than just attending university for the “sake of it”. That is, they are interested much more in *what* a university education can teach them than *who* a university education will make them. Institutions around the country are attempting to ensure that students are not discouraged from attending a particular university simply through an unfamiliar knower code. The same practice can be seen in the ways that independent schools market themselves differently to attract different “kinds” of students: as well as making a socio-economic argument, these institutions are seeking out particular knower codes in potential students.

Maton's case study demonstrates “the application of the concepts of legitimation code and epistemic device beyond their genesis in the analysis of knowledge production” (Maton 2004: 229). As outlined above, a key concern is examining the knower codes exhibited by students, akin to their disposition to education. Matching the categories outlined above in Sect. 2.2, Maton argues that each student is disposed to learn in a certain code. For example, one LCT study (Lamont and Maton 2008, 2010) suggests that students who have the most success in high school music are seen to display an *élite* knower code, matching the dominant specialisation code of knowledge transmission displayed in music pedagogy. Maton suggests that successful knowledge transmission is a result of matching teaching with knower codes. Australian education and training institutions are currently exploring the implications of these ideas; the introduction of online teaching and learning at many institutions can be seen as an attempt to match new student knower codes. The notion of knower codes will be further explored in Chap. 3.

We can also examine how these ideas manifest in specialisation codes of knowledge transmission in teaching. How do teachers legitimate the knowledge that they teach, and how do learning situations reflect this underlying structure? Here we happen upon another instance of creative arts pedagogy disrupting traditional models of teaching and learning. In our classrooms, students are offered some control of the epistemic device themselves; in more traditional settings, the epistemic device is wielded solely by the teacher, who is able to make claims and adjudicate as regards legitimate knowledge. In the Drama workshop though, in particular

when students are encouraged to reflect critically upon their own and *their peers'* learning, the epistemic device is being offered in part to the students. (This, of course, is the much-vaunted “student-centred learning”, which has become an aspiration across the field of education in the 2000s.) We can, therefore, discuss the dominant orientation of teaching within any given discipline, or indeed within a particular classroom. To echo Bernstein’s distrust of binaries, it is of course also possible for teaching to tack between two (or perhaps even more) specialisation codes of knowledge transmission. This occurrence is considered further in Chap. 3.

When considering how LCT can assist us to analyse knowledge transmission, it is important to examine the coding of both the teacher and the student. Students display a dominant orientation to learning through their *knower* coding, and teachers similarly can embody different codes through their pedagogy. The language and framework proposed by LCT allows us to capture these differences—and this is the first step towards addressing this form of difference in the classroom. As advocated above, the most effective teaching and learning takes place when there is an alignment between the dominant code of specialisation in the legitimation and transmission of knowledge, and this code matches the dominant knower code of the student. This speaks to the importance of a precise, concise model for analysing teaching and learning. For the remainder of this chapter, I analyse Drama as an indicative case study, and use the LCT language and framework to unpack the sense of difference felt by teachers and learners within the discipline. I argue here that Drama is specialised by an *élite code*, and before turning to the analysis I briefly unpack that terminology.

2.4 INTERLUDE: ÉLITE BUT NOT ELITIST

In his inaugural address as the Vice Chancellor of the University of Sydney on 22 July 2008, Dr Michael Spence declared repeatedly that “this is an élite, but not elitist, place”. In so doing, he was invoking the problematic history those words have in Australian public discourse—in the country of the under-achiever, where tall poppies are cut ruthlessly down to size, neither are words with which major public institutions often want to associate themselves. It is useful, therefore, to explore Spence’s remarks further to understand exactly the distinction which he was drawing, and indeed whether his understanding of the category of “élite” moves beyond the Oxbridge cliché of white-tied toffs sipping Pimm’s in college quadrangles. Particularly telling is that Spence used this declaration as kind of statement

of resistance to the increased regulation of universities, and proposed it as a rallying call for how the institution may be able to weather the storms of the years to come. “The university sector in Australia is under thorough review”, he told his audience of colleagues and benefactors,

And so Australia, a country of enormous wealth, has a chance to build upon its fine university tradition. But times of review are of course uncertain times, and we could just as easily undermine as build upon our rich inheritance [...] Only clarity about what we do and why we do it will help us chart a steady course through uncertain times ahead (Spence 2008).

His catch-cry of “élite, but not elitist” was designed to provide such certainty.

Lest he be misunderstood from the outset, Spence aligns the word “élite” with excellence, rather than social elitism, and reiterates the University of Sydney’s (hereafter Sydney) commitment to democratising that excellence (despite what current appearances might suggest):

Sydney is unashamedly committed to excellence. This is an élite, but not an elitist, place [...] Sydney is a place committed to finding the best in people of potential from all social backgrounds. Of course the University does not always meet its aspirations, no university does—or at least none with a calling worthy of the name (2008).

To begin to apply the vocabulary introduced earlier in this chapter, Spence was proposing that the personal characteristics of students *do* matter: he was interested in educating “people of potential” after all. Sydney may well be able to help students “find” this quality of excellence, but he presupposed that it existed. The distinction which he was making comes to the fore with the mention of “social backgrounds”, with the implicit suggestion that the University needed to move away from this as a determinant of potential. (Situating as it is in Australia’s wealthiest city, Sydney has constantly battled the perception that it exists primarily to educate the children of the wealthy eastern and northern suburbs.) So here we see the first sign that Spence proposed to use his control of the epistemic device to change the criteria for who might be considered a legitimate knower at Sydney.

It was when he went on to speak about the type of teaching which should go on at Sydney that these ideas were thrown into sharper relief. In discussing what should be the Institution’s core values in this area,

Spence noted that “it’s useful to refer to those languages that make a distinction between *education* and *instruction*. I have no doubt that our core value should be *education* in its broadest, in its moral, sense, and not just instruction” (Spence 2008). Here Spence started to characterise the specialisation codes of knowledge transmission and legitimation that the University should be employing. Rather than paying attention solely to what the students know, a core *knowledge code* idea, teachers were being asked to look beyond this mere “instruction”. It is important to note, though, that Spence did not dismiss this idea, but rather, expanded it:

This has two parts. First we should be honing fundamental intellectual skills, we should be training, and not merely filling, minds [...] And we should be honing these skills in environments in which understanding is not just disseminated, it is also created; environments in which the life of the mind is highly prized and where there is excitement about ideas (2008).

These ideas around honing skills suggest the core *knower code* idea of paying attention to who the students are, and developing certain dispositions in them. Spence characterised this particular valuing of educational capital as a key feature of the kind of university over which he wanted to preside, with the core aim to “equip our students to make the most of their talent. Those intellectual skills, that excitement, these are gifts that will long outlast much of the content we teach” (Spence 2008).

What Spence was proposing, then, was a learning environment in which the *knower code* values of who you are, and the *knowledge code* values of what you know, meet. Happily, he used the same vocabulary as Maton in characterising this as an “*élite*” experience. This applies throughout his remarks to the *what* of teaching, that is, to how we should go about legitimating the kinds of knowledge students are being taught. Spence went further in discussing the *élite code* also as a specialisation code of knowledge transmission when he declared that:

We should encourage our students to participate fully in all of the activities that our University has to offer. Drawn as they are from very different communities and with very different experiences, they have at least as much to teach one another as we have to teach them (2008).

Here, Spence anticipated a broadening of the codes of knowledge transmission in use at Sydney to take into account both who you are and what you know—or, to return to Moore and Maton’s earlier terminology, he was suggesting a positive valuation of both the epistemic and the social

relation to knowledge. Finally, in invoking “talent” and “potential” as markers of the students whom he wanted to see at the university, he proposed that we should seek out students with an *élite knower code*. No longer should we see just the *knowledge code* knowers thrown up by the Australian Tertiary Admission Rank (ATAR)¹ system, but rather our classrooms should be full of students who have these additional personal characteristics. Spence is advocating a shift to an *élite code*:

It’s hard to maintain in a culture that can increasingly see university education as a kind of employment certification process, but for those able and willing to be involved it can be personally transformative. I should emphasise that there’s now much pressure to see university education, particularly for undergraduates, in very different terms to these. There’s pressure to see it as ‘merely’ instruction, or as preparation for one kind of career or another, but our core value should be education, and education in its broadest sense (2008).

2.5 ÉLITE KNOWERS

As noted in Sect. 2.2, the *élite code* of specialisation of knowledge transmission is relatively under-theorised. This is in part because it is an extension that Maton proposed to the sociology of education, which is not directly connected to the earlier formulations of Basil Bernstein. Maton also suggests in almost all of his writing on LCT that the *knowledge* and *knower codes* predominate almost exclusively in educational knowledge transmission (2004: 220). Therefore, in looking for *élite knowers* identified in past studies, there are relatively few places to turn. In the course of the article which devotes the most attention to the *élite code*, Maton (2007: 98) refers to two specific examples: the gentleman scientist of the Enlightenment; and the successful contemporary high school music student (both referred to earlier). In this section, I will analyse these examples in order to unpack some of the characteristics ascribed to *élite knowers* in previous work.

The gentleman scientist example can be unpacked with relative ease. The pursuit of a scientific career in the late seventeenth century (and for a considerable period thereafter) was an option only for the wealthy—and indeed only for the wealthiest—*of men*. Scientific knowledge was, therefore, only produced by men of a certain social class. In order to be a legitimate scientist, it mattered both what you knew (i.e. a grasp of basic scientific principles to which everyone could theoretically have access), but *also* who you were: knowledge produced by this kind of knower was

specialised by reference to *both* the epistemic relation *and* the social relation. “Gentlemen were viewed as the right kind of person to trust because of their freedom of action, codes of virtue and honour. This endowed them with the necessary characteristics that ensured credibility and, hence, compelled assent” (Shapin, quoted in Fontes da Costa 2002: 267). Even in the eighteenth century, the Royal Society would trust the mere word of a gentleman as sufficient “proof” of a scientific discovery or phenomena. Conversely, any woman who attempted to produce legitimate scientific knowledge would automatically be discounted and excluded simply by virtue of the personal characteristic of sex. In this example, Maton is paying particular attention to the legitimation of knowledge, and demonstrating that in this case it was specialised through the *élite code*.

Maton’s second example of the high school music student delves further into the knower code. His basic contention is that success in this discipline (and indeed in similar creative courses) can be linked to both a grasp of the relevant knowledge, and additionally a “taste, judgement or a developed ‘feel’ for it” (Maton 2007: 101). In particular, as music is most often taught as an elective, with comparatively little classroom time devoted to it, the perception Maton explores is that the most successful students are those who bring this “feel” with them into the room. This stands against the logic of the majority of high school teaching, which proceeds by suggesting that any student can have access to the legitimate knowledge of the discipline. However, this is not a simple *knower* versus *knowledge code* divide, as the music student with the “feel” who doesn’t learn the correct knowledge—scales, composers, composition, and so on—will be as unsuccessful as her classmate who has access to all of the legitimate knowledge, without having a “feel” for it. That is, students will find success in this discipline by virtue both of what they know, and also of who they are in terms of personal characteristics.

This combination of personal characteristics and a developed “feel” can be usefully compared to the notion of *habitus*. This is summarised by Maton in an introductory volume on Pierre Bourdieu’s key terminology:

Simply put, *habitus* focusses on our ways of acting, feeling, thinking and being. It captures how we carry within us our history, how we bring this history into our present circumstances, and how we then make choices to act in certain ways and not others. This is an ongoing and active process—we are engaged in a continuous process of making history, but not under conditions entirely of our own making (2008: 52).

Habitus, therefore, is a way in which we can think about the “feel” to which Maton refers—the student who has the correct *habitus* will know how to react “in the moment”, or, to use the vocabulary often used around acting, will display the best “instincts”. That is, performers “make choices to act in certain ways and not others”, and those choices are driven by their *habitus*—as inculcated through education. In order to identify the *élite* coding of potential knowers in creative arts education, I suggest that we can combine notions of taste and *habitus*, and pair them with a rigorous investigation of *what* these knowers actually know. Bourdieu’s insistence that *habitus* is a fluid, malleable set of dispositions also aids an understanding of how it might interact with creative arts education: a particular subject can develop and challenge the *habitus* of its students and therefore set about crafting the right kind of knower.²

In the next section, I will substantiate my claim that Drama as a discipline is specialised by an *élite code*. As I have gestured to above, this coding sets Drama apart from other disciplines within both secondary education and post-secondary education—and it is a coding that is likely shared by other creative arts disciplines. This coding specialises both knowledge legitimation (i.e. what we teach in Drama) and knowledge transmission (the ways in which we teach it). However, as this chapter has so far demonstrated, the *élite code* is a development and extension of the predominant codes in teaching and learning. This is a crucial point, because it speaks to the challenge set in Chap. 1 that we must concentrate on what unites us as discipline experts, rather than always insisting on our difference. If we can characterise Drama as an *élite code* discipline, this allows us to capture our distinction while placing our work in a continuum of practice with that of other disciplines.

2.6 THE ÉLITE CODE IN DRAMA

In the survey which provides most of the data for his study on the *élite code* in British high school music teaching, Maton and his colleagues asked the following question: “[i]n your opinion, how important are these things for being good at [the subject]?” (2007: 101). Students were asked about the following options on a rating scale:

- Skills, technique and specialist knowledge
- Natural-born talent
- Taste, judgement or a developed “feel” for it.

This is a development of an earlier survey, designed to separate the two primary dispositional options: “in theoretical terms, the first (‘skills’) represents the epistemic relation and ‘talent’ and ‘taste’ represent different dimensions of the social relation” (Lamont and Maton 2010: 71). Of the disciplines included in the survey (English, maths, science, history, music, and psychology), music was the only discipline that scored higher on both variables; that is, students selected all three as important bases for achievement. In analysing the data produced, Maton suggests that in disciplines with an *élite* coding, all three factors are considered important to success. The options laid out above, then, can function as a useful description of an élite-coded discipline, and I now relate how Drama embodies each of them.

2.6.1 *Skills, Technique, and Specialist Language*

Like many disciplines within formal education and training, Drama is built on a foundation of particular skills and techniques. These are both performance-oriented, that is particular skills and techniques for building work for performance, and more generic, such as essay-writing skills and other techniques for capturing experiential learning in prose form. In both cases, though, these skills and techniques can be learnt independently of the *quality* of their execution. Examples are peppered throughout Drama syllabus documents and curricula, and can also include specific sets of knowledge to which students are expected to have access. An example from the NSW Drama Stage 6 Syllabus is “conventions”, defined as “common principles of form and/or style shared by performers and audiences, usually by tradition” (BOSTES 2009: 35). In order to succeed at Drama, a student must acquire familiarity with a sanctioned set of “conventions”. The centrality of skills and technique to Drama is revealed in the NSW Drama Years 7–10 Syllabus, which mandates that

Teachers of Drama should employ a range of assessment strategies to ensure that information is being gathered regarding the *knowledge and understanding* that are [*sic*] being acquired, and the *skills* that are being developed (BOSTES 2003: 59, my emphasis).

As highlighted in this extract, the skills, technique and specialist language required to successfully undertake Drama reveal elements of *knowledge code* specialisation throughout the knowledge transmission and legitimisation in the subject.

The case for a specialist language in Drama is made most eloquently by the NSW Board of Studies, that includes a “Glossary” at the end of the Drama Stage 6 Syllabus. As well as words commonly used across various disciplines, this glossary sets out the specific meaning of phrases on which outcomes and assessment rest, including the “elements of Drama”—which “include tension, focus, rhythm, space, movement, sound, time, symbol, mood, pace, pause and atmosphere, character/role, actor and audience relationship” (BOSTES 2009: 35). In order to be successful in Drama, a student must be able to identify these phrases and their specific, bounded meanings—especially in those cases where the contextual meaning diverges from the everyday usage of a term. Taken together, the skills, techniques and specialist language of Drama are those elements that can be learnt and experienced by all, regardless of any personal characteristics; whether it is specific vocabulary or historical information, a particular set of physical actions, or a methodology for creating work for performance. These pockets of knowledge-coded material exist throughout the Drama curriculum, and while students sometimes interpret them as a disruption to the “real work” of Drama—every Drama teacher is familiar with the groans that accompany a theory-driven class, or even one that asks students to sit behind desks—they are often the foundations on which the remainder of the discipline is built.

2.6.2 *Natural-Born Talent*

In Ross Prior’s book-length study on *Teaching Actors*, there is an oft-repeated assertion that the first step in actor training is the identification of talent, or the “it”-factor. Talent here is read as “an elusive quality that cannot be taught or learned. It seems to exist separately from skill, technique and knowledge” (Rideout 1995: 13–4). However elusive it might be, this notion of “talent” in the way Rideout reads it is one around which the entire field of the creative arts is arguably organised: Robert Cohen goes so far as to assert it is the “*sine qua non* of a performer” (Cohen 1998: 12). Throughout his book, Prior quotes innumerable acting teachers who claim that they can identify this talent in seemingly impossibly short periods, and assert that it is the precondition for a successful creative career. Theorists and teachers often tie themselves in knots discussing this quality, although they are united in agreeing that it can neither be quantified nor captured by language.

Although we often seek to downplay it at a secondary level, talent is a part of what a successful Drama student displays. It is not the precondition for success that it might be at a professional level, but nonetheless it plays a

role in our students' assessment. To take the example of the NSW Higher School Certificate³ (HSC) for Drama, up to 60 % of a student's final mark can turn on their performance on the day of examination.⁴ Skilful selection of elective components can minimise this, as only one of the five options for the Individual Project (IP) requires solo performance, but only to around 20 %—each student must be part of a Group Performance (GP) marked out of 30, of which 10 marks are for skills and 10 are for character. The remaining ten marks, awarded for structure and dramatic coherence, are awarded partly on the basis of performance but also take into account the innovation, flair, and integrity of the work as a whole. This is not to suggest that a student untalented at performance cannot succeed in HSC Drama, however, it is one of a number of indicators of success in the subject.

2.6.3 *Taste, Judgement, or a Developed “Feel” for It*

Further evidence of a knower-coded modality is indicated by the role that taste, judgement and a “feel” for it play in Drama education. This is indicated by the prevalence of words such as “instincts” or “authenticity” in the way we discuss our students' work. There is a link with talent, but the two are separate: a talented student whose instincts are not honed will still find herself at a disadvantage. Taste is inculcated in students through, for example, canonicity, whereby a student will be exposed throughout her Drama education to the “right” kind of work. This taste is set by curriculum makers (or, to adopt the language of LCT, by those who control the epistemic device), and is often implicit: without necessarily doing so overtly, many Drama curricula embrace similar movements and texts. A curriculum document such as the HSC Drama syllabus is an embodiment of a particular taste; the texts that are set for study, and the frameworks through which they are viewed, have been sanctioned by the taste-makers responsible for its creation. This notion of taste is passed to our students through the work to which they are exposed, both inside and outside the classroom. This is one reason why students who do not have access to a rich performance ecology, such as those living in rural environments or from LSE backgrounds, can struggle to replicate the “right” taste in the work they create. The role of new broadcast technologies and digital performance repositories in allowing students unprecedented access to high-quality performance cannot be understated.

Judgement and a developed “feel” for it are more difficult to capture in the terms offered by our curricula and assessment; however, as noted

above, they are central to Drama education. The role of improvisation in our curricula is a strong indicator of the role of instinct, but the same skills are required for success across Drama education. Good dramatic instincts assist students in creating work in many and varied contexts—and this is especially important where their “on-the-floor”⁵ activities and performance form the basis of later written reflection in essays and other more formal writing. Drama and other creative arts subjects are often distinguished by their co-curricular offerings: many classroom Drama students also elect to participate in productions and other activities outside the classroom. This assists students in developing a “feel” for it, and the *habitus* they develop in co-curricular Drama is transposable to the classroom (and vice-versa). Finally, the notion of a transposable set of dispositions resonates closely with skills and technique as discussed above. In both cases, we are discussing a discrete set of stuff to which our ideal student has access: in one case, specialised by specific knowledge; and in the other, by particular personal characteristics.

2.6.4 Conclusion

As this final formulation suggests, I am arguing here that Drama is distinguished by its *élite code* specialisation. In order to find success in secondary school Drama, students require *both* access to specialist knowledge *and* specific personal characteristics. As I go on to discuss in the following chapters, this *élite coding* is the source of some of Drama’s particular strengths, as well as its greatest weaknesses. Analysing any discipline through the LCT framework will reveal its distinctive modality, and can assist in understanding the various bases for student success or failure. As well as revealing the underlying grammar of knowledge in the discipline, an LCT-inflected analysis can also reveal many different types of misalignment, to which I turn my attention in the following chapter. In the following section, I offer a specific reading of the learning environment depicted in *Monsters University* to demonstrate such an analysis, and conclude this chapter.

2.7 CASE STUDY: MONSTERS UNIVERSITY

Mike and Sulley arrive at Monsters University to study in the prestigious scare program. From the outset, they discover that they are very different kinds of students: in their first class, while Mike is answering a question about the properties of an effective roar, Sulley enters the room with a

“booming roar”, and says “I heard someone say roar, so I just kinda went for it” (Gerson and Baird 2013: 22). When Mike offers to continue, this exchange with the lecturer follows:

Mike: Um, I’m sorry, should I keep going?
Prof. Knight: No, no, Mr. Sullivan’s covered it.
 (Gerson and Baird 2013: 23).

This serves as the viewer’s first introduction to the characters, and immediately they are marked as different kinds of learners. This is confirmed a few minutes later, when Sulley interrupts Mike studying for their Scaring course one evening after class:

Sulley: Pssh, you don’t need to study scaring, you just do it.
Mike: Really? I think there’s a little more to it than that.
 (Gerson and Baird, 2013: 28).

While Mike is concerned with studying the correct knowledge in order to become an effective Scaring student, Sulley counts on the personal characteristics that he already possesses will ensure his success in Scaring.

As their first classes at Monsters University continue, it seems that Mike is the student who will meet with success: while Mike is shown achieving an A+ on a written test, Sulley receives a C–. Almost immediately afterwards, a practical session is shown where Mike runs through a number of scare “faces” with names like “Ogre’s slump” and “Zombie snarl”. In the screenplay, it is specified that “the professor is thoroughly impressed” (Gerson and Baird 2013: 40). Sulley, on the other hand, attempts to repeat his success from the very first class—only to be told by Professor Knight that “one frightening face does not a scarer make, Mr. Sullivan” (Gerson and Baird 2013: 40). While Mike continues to wear his hard work as a badge of honour, Sulley reiterates his scepticism, even as they argue furiously while waiting to take their term final practical examination:

Mike: Unlike you, I had to work to get into the scare program.
Sulley: That’s because you don’t belong here.
 (Gerson and Baird, 2013: 44).

While Sulley is convinced that Mike neither looks nor “feels” like the right type of person to be a Scaring student, Mike asserts that Sulley doesn’t have the right knowledge to be effective.

Applying an LCT analysis to this learning situation, it is immediately clear that Mike and Sulley have different *knower codes*. Mike, who believes expertise is achieved by knowing the most amount of stuff and that knowledge is therefore specialised by the epistemic relation, is a *knowledge-coded learner*. On the other hand, Sulley's insistence that inherent personal characteristics are pre-eminent marks him as a *knower-coded learner*, who values knowledge specialised by the social relation. From what we are shown of the teaching to this point—it appears that Prof. Knight's class is the only one in which the students are enrolled at this point—knowledge transmission and legitimation is specialised primarily by the *knowledge code*: while Knight was impressed with Sulley's famous surname, his primary methodology is to teach a sanctioned, introductory knowledge set. This is supported by the detailed Monsters University website that was created to accompany the film's release,⁶ and is still live three years later, which describes this class:

SCAR101. Intro to Scaring (3 units)

Introductory-level class for all incoming Scaring students. Establishes a foundation for the scaring degree course of study.

Characterising this class as a “foundation” on which the remainder of the course is built confirms its *knowledge* coding.

This characterisation, though, is disrupted by the figure of Dean Hardscrabble, who is the Dean of the School of Scaring, and a legendary scarer in her own right. In her first interaction with the Scare students, she informs them on their first day that “scariness is the true measure of a monster. If you're not scary, what kind of monster are you?” (Gerson and Baird 2013: 22–3). “Scariness” here is read as a particular personal characteristic, and the fact that the awe she inspires as Dean stems from her breaking “the all-time scare record” (Gerson and Baird 2013: 22) with the scream stored in the Scaring classroom seems to confirm her *knower* coding, or prioritising of the social relation. However, her interrogation of Mike and Sulley at their term final reveals a more complex picture. She gives Mike some details of the child he is going to scare, and then demands

Hardscrabble: (*leaning in*) Which scare do you use?

Mike: That is a shadow approach with a crackle holler.

Hardscrabble: Demonstrate.

Mike moves through the steps of the scare deliberately. He takes a deep breath, preparing to scare, when:

Hardscrabble: Stop. Thank you.

Mike: But I didn't get to sh—

Hardscrabble: I've seen enough.

Hardscrabble turns to Sulley.

Hardscrabble: I'm a seven-year-old boy—

Sulley steps forward and roars ferociously. Hardscrabble is unimpressed.

Sulley: (*interrupting*) ROAR!

Hardscrabble: I wasn't finished.

Sulley: I don't need to know any of that stuff to scare.

Hardscrabble: That "stuff" would have informed you that this particular child is afraid of snakes. So a roar wouldn't make him scream, it would make him cry, alerting his parents, exposing the monster world, destroying life as we know it, and of course, we can't have that, so I'm afraid I cannot recommend that you continue in the scaring program, good day.

Sulley: (*laughing, then it dawns on him*) Wait, what? But I'm a Sullivan.

Hardscrabble: (*smiling*) Well then, I'm sure your family will be very disappointed.

Sulley is incredulous, confused. [...] He turns to Mike and stares at him with pure hate and then marches off. Mike watches Sulley leave, concerned.

Hardscrabble: And Mr. Wazowski, what you lack is something that cannot be taught, you're not scary.

Mike stands there, stunned.

Hardscrabble: You will not be continuing in the scaring program.

(Gerson and Baird 2013: 46–8).

In this exchange, Hardscrabble reveals that she values *both* personal characteristics *and* specific knowledge: while Mike is “not scary”, Sulley does not heed the “stuff” that would have enabled him to scare effectively. An LCT analysis of Hardscrabble’s pronouncements in this scene thus reveals that she is operating with an *élite coding*, which values both who a student is, and what that student knows: in order to find success in the Scare program a student should be able to match this modality, and it is clear to Hardscrabble that neither Mike nor Sulley possesses the correct “fit”.

The remaining two-thirds of *Monsters University*, which follows the travails of Mike and Sulley as they try to win back their places in the Scaring program through the Scare Games, shows the two students gradually recognising this *élite coding*. In order to win the Games, Mike and Sulley have to become what Mike calls “the whole package” (Gerson and Baird 2013: 58)—students who are able to draw on both specialist knowledge and personal resources. This challenge is captured in Sulley’s advice to Mike as they prepare for the final challenge of the Scare Games:

Sulley: Okay, you've memorised every textbook, every scare theory and that is great [...] but now, it's time to forget all that. Just reach deep down and "Let the Scary Out" (Gerson and Baird 2013: 111).

Although delivered from the perspective of Sulley's *knower* coding, this pronouncement nonetheless reflects his realisation that Mike must be both smart and scary to succeed. Ultimately, neither Mike nor Sulley is successful in re-joining the Scare program; however, they learn that they are strongest as a pair—in combining Mike's *knowledge* coding with Sulley's *knower* coding, they are able to match the *élite* coding of the field. As the end of this film makes clear—and as its sequel *Monsters Inc.* (2001) depicts—Mike and Sulley go on to become *élite* scarers, but always as an inseparable pair.

NOTES

1. Under this system, school leavers in participating states are awarded a ranking based on their final examination results, with subjects allocated a scaled value in a notoriously labyrinthine calculation. The rank, which is a figure out of 100 moving in increments of 0.05 down from 99.95 to 30.00, corresponds to the percentage of the candidates in the cohort to whom the holder's examination results were superior. (30.00 is the lowest rank released—candidates who score lower than this are reported as "under 30"—but ranks are technically calculated all the way down to 0. Most of these places are taken up by those candidates who did not complete the final year of schooling, as "cohort" for the purposes of Australian Tertiary Admission Rank (ATAR) calculation refers to all of the students who commenced secondary schooling, regardless of whether they completed.) A candidate's ATAR is then used to make offers to students for the vast majority of university courses, in lieu of an interview or a personal essay, or any of the myriad other means for course entry. The published ATAR "cut-off" for entry to a particular course then is the lowest rank attained by a student offered a place in the course.
2. I have introduced the notion of *habitus* here because it is central to Maton's work. However, for the purposes of my own argument, I do not pursue Bourdieu's conception of *habitus* further, preferring instead to utilise the term "dispositions" in order to make the argument more accessible.

3. The Higher School Certificate is the final secondary qualification undertaken by students in NSW. It is divided into a Preliminary Course (Year 11) and an HSC Course (Year 12). Each State and Territory in Australia has its own equivalent qualification. Every State and Territory except Queensland subsequently awards eligible students an Australian Tertiary Admission Rank (ATAR), which is discussed further below. Queensland retains its system of Overall Position (OP) for tertiary entrance.
4. “For each student, the HSC examination for Drama consists of a written examination worth a total of 40 marks, a compulsory group performance worth 30 marks, and an individual project worth 30 marks” (HSC Drama Marking Guidelines—Practical tasks and submitted works [BOSTES n.d.]). The Group Performance is undertaken in a group of between three and six students, who create an original performance work of eight to twelve minutes’ duration that is a complete theatrical statement in response to one of eight prescribed stimuli (BOSTES 2015b). For the Individual Project, students undertake a project in one of: critical analysis; design; performance; scriptwriting; or video Drama. Outcome lengths vary, from 3000 to 3500 words for written responses, to 6–8 minutes for live performance or video. Full details can be found in “Assessment and Reporting in Drama Stage 6” (BOSTES 2015b).
5. In a theatre rehearsal process, there is often a distinction made between work “at the table” (usually text work, discussion, etc.) and practical work “on the floor”. For more information, see Rossmannith (2009).
6. This website, available at www.monstersuniversity.com/edu/, is a pitch perfect parody of a typical contemporary University or College website, complete with lofty rhetoric and smiling diverse students.

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