CHAPTER 16

Thinking like Bourdieu: Completing the Mental Revolution with Legitimation Code Theory

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INTRODUCTION

How can we think like Bourdieu? This is a crucial question for understanding and enacting field theory. Bourdieu argued that the essential task of social science is to produce a “new gaze” that moves beyond everyday sensual experience to grasp the relational principles underlying the empirical world (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 251). However, achieving such a relational gaze is not easy. Bourdieusian commentators often criticise applications of his ideas as offering a veneer of concepts over empirical description rather than a genuinely relational analysis. Bourdieu himself acknowledged that achieving this new gaze “cannot be done without a genuine conversion, a *metanoia*, a mental revolution, a transformation of one’s whole vision of the social world” (p. 251). In this chapter I argue that while Bourdieu powerfully argues for this transformation, field theory does not itself fully embody relational thinking. The conceptual framework represents an unfinished
“mental revolution” that needs augmenting to achieve Bourdieu’s aims. To do so I reach “beyond the field theory we know” to Legitimation Code Theory (LCT), a framework that reveals the organising principles underlying fields, capitals, habituses and practices. I illustrate how LCT can help realise Bourdieu’s vision by briefly discussing a major study of Chinese students at an Australian university. I show how LCT reveals the principles characterising their habituses, pedagogic environments, experiences and learning practices. This analysis identifies a “code clash” between students’ habituses and the attributes valorised by their teachers that explains both their negative experiences and a “hysteresis of habitus” effect whereby they continued strategies that mismatched the “rules of the game”. Crucially, this analysis offers a relational account by showing the organising principles underlying these dispositions, positions and practices. It thus illustrates how LCT concepts embody Bourdieu’s mental revolution and so can help others to achieve his relational gaze.

**Bourdieu’s Gaze**

As Wacquant argued,

> the enduring significance of Bourdieu’s enterprise does not reside in the individual concepts, substantive theories, methodological prescriptions, or empirical observations he offers so much as in the manner in which he produces, uses and relates them ... it is the *modus operandi* of Bourdieu’s sociology... that most fully defines its originality. (in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. ix)

For Bourdieu, this *modus operandi*—“the craft of sociology”—is embodied in a way of seeing and thinking. He emphasised that to “master in a practical state everything that is contained in the fundamental concepts: habitus, field, and so on” (Bourdieu et al. 1991, p. 253), one must acquire a “gaze” or “sociological eye” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 251). However, Bourdieu repeatedly emphasised that achieving this gaze was not easy because it involves a “break” or “rupture” with understandings of the social world that focus on sensual experience. The difficulty arises from such understandings being easily taken for granted as self-evident, an illusion of immediacy and transparency that naturalises the social world. For Bourdieu (1984), one must especially break with thinking in terms of separate and visible empirical entities, a “substantialist” form
of thinking that lends itself to essentialism by treating properties as located within specific entities (p. 22). In contrast, Bourdieu emphasised a relational mode of thinking that conceives phenomena as realisations of generative principles that are relationally defined. For Bourdieu, “the real is the relational” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 97).

In Bourdieu’s approach, “the relational” has horizontal and vertical dimensions. First, Bourdieu (1990, pp. 52–65) viewed practice as arising from relations between “two histories” or evolving logics: agents’ dispositions (“habitus”) and the positions they occupy (by virtue of their “capital”) within an evolving system (“field”). As illustrated by the formula “[((habitus)(capital)) + field = practice” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 101), this horizontally relates concepts, offering a corrective to accounts that explore only either the attributes of agents or their social contexts. Second, each of these logics is itself relationally conceived: an agent’s dispositions (habitus) are understood as one structure among a range of possible structures; and positions are explored in terms of an agent’s status and resources (capital) in relation to those of other agents within a structured social universe (field) that is itself defined in relation to other social universes. This is to take field, capital, habitus and practice separately and vertically relate the specific structure of each to other possible structures. In other words, Bourdieu emphasises the need to analyse the organising principles underlying empirical realisations of each concept, where the specific setting of those principles (its “structure”) derives its characteristics from relations with other possible settings. Grasping both these horizontal and vertical dimensions of relational thinking is crucial to achieving Bourdieu’s “mental revolution” and acquiring his “new gaze”.

However, the difficulties of thinking relationally are demonstrated by applications of Bourdieu’s ideas. A series of Bourdieusian commentators have described many studies using his concepts as shallow, reductive and partial (e.g. Reay 2004; Grenfell 2010; Atkinson 2011; James 2015). Often criticisms effectively highlight a lack of one or both dimensions of relationality. Horizontally, analyses of practice are often solely in terms of either agents’ dispositions (using “habitus”) or positions (using “capital” or, less frequently, “field”). Vertically, concepts are often used to re-label empirical characteristics rather than to examine the organising principles underlying dispositions, positions and practices. Such analyses veneer description with theory; for example, social background becomes “habitus”, valued attributes become “capital”, and context becomes “field”. This reintroduces substantialism into field theory, rendering the
approach anything but ‘Bourdiesian’. As commentators argue, without deep relationality the concepts are reduced “to a meaningless descriptive vocabulary” (Atkinson 2012, p. 169).

In short, Bourdieu’s concepts have been more widely adopted than his way of thinking: ideas from field theory are often applied without a relational gaze. However, it would be unrelational to lambast scholars but ignore the framework they are using. In this case the framework plays a role because Bourdieu’s concepts do not fully embody the relational thinking he called for. This is not easy to see. It is hard to point to what is hidden by a blind spot, though it can become evident through seeing what new concepts reveal, as I show below. Moreover, Bourdieu intended the concepts to be relational, called them relational and repeatedly cautioned against non-relational thinking. Nonetheless, as highlighted by Boudon’s (1971) distinction between “intentional” and “operative” definitions, there is a difference between intending to construct an object of study relationally and implementing that intention, which may not be possible “because the necessary mental tools are not available” (p. 51). In this case, the tools cannot fully implement a relational gaze: they are “intentional” rather than “operative”.

**X Marks the Blind Spot**

Consider Bourdieu’s notion that practice results from the meeting of “two histories”, dispositions and positions, each with its own logic or structure. This raises questions of the nature of those logics, or the organising principles underlying dispositions, positions and practices. These principles are pointed to by Bourdieu’s concepts but not relationally conceptualised. For example, Bourdieu (1994) defines “habitus” as a “structured and structuring structure” (p. 170) but does not provide the means to conceptualise that structure as, say, $X$ among a range of possible structures $W, X, Y, Z$. Accordingly, the effects of habitus are typically shown by scholars describing the practices to which it gives rise, rather than habitus itself being analysed in terms of its underlying principles and the system of possible settings of those principles that give a particular setting its meaning (cf. Bourdieu 1990, p. 4). Without exploring those principles, one can argue that agents feel like “fish out of water” because their habituses do not match the field (to take an oft-used example), but one cannot show the *basis* of that mismatch: one cannot reveal the $X$ structure of the habitus and the $Y$ structure dominating the field.
Moreover, without conceptualising these structures, one cannot systematically show similarity and difference or change over time. What is, for example, the structure of a “working-class habitus” and how does it differ from that of a “middle-class habitus”? (I mention social class but these points hold for other categories, including gender and ethnicity.) How can one show when an agent’s habitus has changed or remained the same between different situations or over time? The same questions can be asked of similarity, difference and change in the structures of “capital”, “position”, “field” and “practice”. To avoid using these concepts as a veneer requires a “break” or “rupture” with empirical description into a conceptual language that reveals these structures without merely recounting agents’ practices. The aim is to reveal the organising principles (the $X$) underlying a specific set of empirical instances and show how they may be varied (e.g. to $W$, $Y$, $Z$) to generate different empirical instances. As Bourdieu (in Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) insisted:

The challenge is systematically to interrogate the particular case by constituting it as a ‘particular instance of the possible,’ as Bachelard (1949) put it, in order to extract general or invariant properties that can be uncovered only by such interrogation. (p. 233)

In his major studies Bourdieu began to reveal these properties, typically through binary categories. For example, in his study of French cultural taste (Bourdieu 1984), the distinctive lifestyles and consumer preferences of working-class and bourgeois subcultures were characterised by “virtue of necessity” and “freedom from necessity”, respectively. Similarly, in his study of the academic field, Bourdieu (1988) characterised agents striving for “intellectual capital” (such as scholarly renown) as oriented inwards towards the field’s specific activities and agents striving for “academic capital” (institutional power as oriented outwards to economic and political forms of success). However, while these dichotomous types highlight what needs to be conceptualised as relational principles, those principles remained just out of reach; in these examples, there are no concepts for analysing degrees of distance from necessity or strengths of external boundaries. Without those concepts, the analysis does not extract “general or invariant properties” that could be used in studies of other fields—the binary categories are locked into their objects of study. This matters because, lacking such concepts, many scholars using Bourdieu’s approach rely instead on the pre-constructed notions
he warned against, such as citing social classes to proclaim, for example, a disjuncture between the “working-class habitus” of a student and a “middle-class” educational institution. By using such pre-constructed categories, such descriptions present as self-evident the very things that need to be analysed: the structure of the habitus and the structure of the capital valorised by that position in the field. The concepts then add little to empirical description beyond a veneer of theoretical sophistication. Bourdieu often emphasised the need for “vigilance” to avoid these problems but conceded that the “mere fact of being on the alert is important but hardly suffices” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, p. 238). One also needs relational concepts.

In sum, to understand practice relationally one must conceptualise “vertically” by revealing the relational $X$ of, say, a habitus in order to analyse “horizontally” by relating that $X$ to the $X$, $W$, $Y$ or $Z$ of capital, position, practice, etc. This entails a break from description in terms of pre-constructed categories into a conceptual language capable of revealing and relating these relational structures. Relational analysis thus requires not only a relational gaze but also relational concepts. However, while Bourdieu made clear what a relational gaze entails, his concepts do not fully embody that gaze—they are extremely powerful. Rather, it is to recognise the limits of the concepts as they currently stand and to highlight why they need augmenting if we are to implement Bourdieu’s intentions. Specifically, we require a means of conceptualising the organising principles (the $X$) underlying dispositions, positions and practices. Without those concepts, the framework will continue to lend itself to veneering of empirical description by scholars lacking a relational gaze. Moreover, it will remain extremely difficult for anyone to acquire that gaze, as even prolonged and sustained use of Bourdieu’s concepts cannot shape, enact or sustain a relational gaze—they lack the $X$ factor. The need, then, is for relational concepts that convert Bourdieu’s gaze into tools capable of helping others acquire that gaze. For this, I turn to Legitimation Code Theory.

**LCT: An Invitation to Relational Sociology**

Legitimation Code Theory or “LCT” is a sociological framework that extends, *inter alia*, Bourdieu’s field theory and Bernstein’s code theory (Maton 2014). Since emerging at the turn of the century, LCT has grown rapidly as the basis of research by an international and
multidisciplinary community into a widening range of issues in education, politics, law and other social fields (Maton et al. 2016). The framework of LCT comprises a multidimensional conceptual toolkit. Each dimension includes concepts for analysing a particular set of organising principles as a species of *legitimation code* (Maton 2014). These dimensions are “simultaneous”: they explore not different objects of study but rather different organising principles that may underlie the same object. Thus, empirical studies often adopt more than one dimension in analysis. Any of the dimensions of LCT could be used here to reveal relational principles underlying dispositions, positions and practices. For brevity, I focus on one, Specialisation, which is centred on *specialization codes*.

The dimension of Specialisation begins from the simple premise that practices are about or oriented towards something and by someone. One can thus analytically distinguish: *epistemic relations* (ER) between practices and their object or focus; and *social relations* (SR) between practices and their subject, author or agent. When applied to knowledge practices, these highlight questions of *what* can be legitimately described as knowledge (epistemic relations), and *who* can claim to be a legitimate knower (social relations).

Each relation may be more strongly (+) or weakly (−) emphasised as the basis of legitimacy. These two strengths may be varied independently to generate *specialization codes* (ER+/−, SR+/−). As shown in Fig. 16.1, the two continua of strengths can be visualised as axes of the *specialization plane*, a topological space with four principal codes:

- **knowledge codes** (ER+, SR−), where possession of specialised knowledge, principles or procedures of specific objects of study is emphasised on the basis of achievement, and attributes of agents are downplayed;
- **knower codes** (ER−, SR+), where specialised knowledge and objects are downplayed and attributes of agents are emphasised as measures of achievement, whether viewed as born (e.g. “natural talent”), cultivated (e.g. “taste”) or social (e.g. standpoint theory);
- **élite codes** (ER+, SR+), where legitimacy is based on both possessing specialist knowledge and being the right kind of knower; and
- **relativist codes** (ER−, SR−), where legitimacy is determined by neither specialist knowledge nor knower attributes—“anything goes”. 
To understand these concepts in terms of field theory consider Bourdieu’s (1991) description of a “social topology”:

the social world can be represented in the form of a (multi-dimensional) space constructed on the basis of principles of differentiation or distribution constituted by the set of properties active in the social universe under consideration, that is, able to confer force or power on their possessor in that universe. Agents and groups of agents are thus defined by their relative positions in this space. (pp. 229–230; original emphasis)

Specialisation visualises one dimension of this space as the *specialization plane* (Fig. 16.1), in which agents occupy relational positions. Specialisation codes are one set of the “principles of differentiation” constructing the social universe. The specialisation plane outlines the full range of possible positions that could be occupied. The particular specialisation codes that are “active in the social universe” are determined by empirical research. Bourdieu describes such social universes as “fields of forces”, where these forces within which agents are positioned are (contrary to substantialism) irreducible to interactions among them.
Specialisation codes conceptualise one dimension of those forces that constitute fields. They are able to “confer force or power on their possessor”: a dominant code is both privileged (having priority) and privileging (conferring power upon possessors). Accordingly, agents attempt to maximise their positions by ensuring their own codes are dominant in the social universe.

Specialisation codes conceptualise one set of the organising principles underlying dispositions, positions and practices. Put simply, the basis of legitimacy for each code is: what you know (knowledge codes), the kind of knower you are (knower codes), both (élite codes), or neither (relativist codes). A specific specialisation code may dominate as the basis of achievement, but may not be transparent, universal or uncontested. Not everyone may recognise and/or be able to realise what is required, there may be more than one code present, and there are likely to be struggles among agents over which code is dominant. One can thus describe degrees of code match and code clash, such as between learners’ dispositions and pedagogic practices (see below), education policies and disciplinary conventions, different approaches within an intellectual field, etc. For example, studies of a large-scale educational initiative in Australian schools (Howard and Maton 2011) show the policy successfully integrated technology into subject areas matching its knower-code intentions but was less successful in subjects with other specialisation codes, where code clashes were evident. The dominant code may also change, such as between subject areas, classrooms and stages of a curriculum in education or, for dispositions, over the lifecourse. These code shifts can change the “rules of the game”. For example, research into music in English schooling (Lamont and Maton 2010) revealed the curriculum shifted from a knower code at primary school to a knowledge code in the early years of secondary school, and then towards an élite code for formal school qualifications in senior secondary school. Such code shifts can have profound implications, such as causing previously successful agents to struggle or, in the case of music, reducing the take-up rate of qualifications.

Relational Concepts

Specialisation codes are but one species of legitimation code—there are more organising principles conceptualised by LCT (Maton 2014). Moreover, these concepts are better understood within the wider context of the sociological approach of LCT, one which builds on Bourdieu’s
field theory of practice. Space precludes summarising here his accounts of how society comprises a series of relatively autonomous social fields of practice, how agents struggle to maximise their positions within the hierarchies of those fields, how they differentially acquire a “feel for the game”, how their past experiences are embodied in habituses that shape practices in relation to the evolving structures of the fields, and so forth. Space also precludes demonstrating the centrality of this understanding to LCT, though it will be recognised by anyone familiar with Bourdieu’s approach. More pertinent here are three characteristics of legitimation codes (including specialisation codes) that explain how the concepts embody a relational gaze.

First, legitimation codes explore organising principles—they reveal the $X$, enabling vertical relationality. Rather than using pre-constructed categories, offering ideal types or veneering descriptions, legitimation codes conceptualise the principles or structures underlying empirical realisations of dispositions, positions and practices.

Second, legitimation codes are “operative” relational concepts—the $X$s they reveal are relationally constructed. For example, when determining the specialisation codes characterising a set of practices, the strength of their epistemic relations is relative to strengths of epistemic relations of other possible practices, and the strength of their social relations is relative to strengths of social relations of other possible practices. These relative strengths locate the practices on the $y$-axis and $x$-axis of the plane (Fig. 16.1), giving their specialisation code. Thus, each instance is constructed as a “particular instance of the possible” by showing both its position on the plane (and code) and the full range of possible positions (and codes) not occupied. The topology of the plane allows for an infinite number of relational positions. Legitimation codes are thus neither binary categories nor simply a typology. One can chart every instance of, say, interaction in a classroom or publications in a discipline as a scattergraph reaching across the plane, revealing both the dominant code and the diversity of codes at play. Similarly, one can chart change over time by tracing positions across the plane, such as movement from a knowledge code to a knower code.

Third, legitimation codes are not limited to a specific phenomenon, enabling horizontal relationality. They can be used to conceptualise the principles underlying habituses, configurations of capital, structures of a field, sets of practices, and numerous other phenomena, such as affordances of technology or attributes of institutions. Each can be coded
using the same concepts, so each \( X \) can be related to other \( X \)'s. Thus, as mentioned above, one can show degrees of \textit{code match} or \textit{code clash}, such as between the knower code of an agent’s habitus and the knowledge code dominating a field. Moreover, by showing changes over time \textit{within} the organising principles of phenomena (field, capital, habitus, etc.), the concepts enable analysis of changes in relations \textit{among} them. For example, one can reveal where an agent’s experiences engender “code shifting” of their habitus from knower code to knowledge code to match the dominant code of a field. By revealing \( X \)'s underlying all the phenomena highlighted by Bourdieu, the possibilities for deepening Bourdieusian explanations are manifold.

It should be clear that LCT concepts are complementary to, rather than in competition with, Bourdieu’s tools. They offer a conceptual language that “breaks” with substantialist description and embodies relational thinking, as Bourdieu argued. Indeed, by revealing the organising principles of field, habitus, capital and practice, they boost the explanatory potential of his concepts. LCT thereby enables field theory to achieve a deep relational analysis and so generate greater explanatory power. In short, Bourdieu highlighted what needs to be analysed and how; LCT provides additional tools for putting those intentions into practice. To illustrate how, I shall briefly discuss a major study by Rainbow Chen \cite{Chen_2010} that used the concepts of specialisation codes to explore the experiences of Chinese students at an Australian university.

\textbf{A Case from the \( X \)-Files}

Most research into Chinese students who are overseas exhibits substantialism. Typically, studies focus on the ostensible attributes of students and neglect the educational environments they experience, leading to an essentialist and deficit model of students. In contrast, Chen’s relational study analysed: (1) the dispositions to education brought by Chinese students; (2) the educational environments they encountered in Australia; and (3) their experiences and practices. In short, the study viewed agents’ practice as resulting from the meeting of dispositions with positions and analysed each of their organising principles. Data comprised: (1) focus groups with Chinese students across the university; (2) interviews with teaching staff and analysis of teaching materials; and (3) in-depth, recurrent interviews with seven Chinese students in a single faculty (41 hours total) through the course of their postgraduate
learning. I can give only the briefest précis of this research, see Maton and Chen (2017) for a summary and Chen (2010) for the full study. Here I simply highlight how the concepts of specialisation codes revealed the principles underlying student habituses, the environments they encountered, their experiences and resulting practices, and then brought these diverse phenomena together to generate explanatory power.

**Student Dispositions**

When describing the experiences and expectations about education they brought from China, participants emphasised learning strongly bounded “academic” knowledge; for example: “the information in the textbook, decided by the teacher, was what the study unit was all about”. Teachers were described as experts in this content knowledge and teaching as explicit and clear procedures with strong control over selection, sequencing and pacing of knowledge. What was required of students in assessment was similarly explicit, unambiguous and concerned this knowledge. In short, the students described achievement as emphasising specialised knowledge and procedures: *relatively strong epistemic relations* (ER+). In contrast, students rarely considered their personal experiences as relevant to learning. They also emphasised the need to adopt self-effacing roles, such as asking questions only when sure they contribute to learning for the whole class. One described a cardinal rule of classroom behaviour as: “Don’t disturb the class. Even if your question is brilliant”. Similarly, academic achievement was said to require withholding one’s own views. Students stated that assessment should require textbook-based answers affording limited latitude and avoiding personal opinions; for example: “if I had written my answers on exams according to what I thought, not the book, they wouldn’t have been standard, right answers”. In short, education was described as downplaying personal experiences and views: *relatively weak social relations* (SR–).

As Fig. 16.2 highlights, the dispositions to education brought by the Chinese students embodied stronger epistemic relations and weaker social relations or a *knowledge code* (ER+, SR–). In other words, they valorised capital based on specialised knowledge, procedures and skills and devalorised capital based on personal attributes of knowers. This knowledge-code habitus was empirically realised in education contexts as valorisation of: curriculum emphasising academic knowledge and
downplaying personal experience; pedagogy involving procedural delivery of teachers’ expert knowledge of subject content and downplaying personal dimensions of learning; and assessment comprising explicit and impersonal criteria for evaluating learners’ understanding (Chen 2010, pp. 90–118).

**Learning Environments**

The Chinese students were studying at an Australian university’s Faculty of Education but were taught primarily online. In these learning environments teaching blurred all boundaries around “academic” knowledge. There was little core content to the units, and teachers encouraged students to treat reading materials as optional. They also denigrated as “instructivist” any teaching where teachers select, sequence or pace knowledge. Instead, they advocated “constructivist” pedagogy, described themselves as “facilitators” or “co-learners” and stressed they did not claim expert knowledge. Assessments similarly downplayed guidelines, comprising “authentic” assessments that “situate the assignment in the...
context in which these people work and live” and eschew explicit evalu-
orative criteria, ostensibly legitimating all forms of knowledge. The edu-
cational environment thus downplayed specialised knowledge, skills or
procedures: relatively weak epistemic relations (ER–).

In contrast, teachers emphasised the value of personal experience and
viewed students as already legitimate knowers. Students were expected
to make their own decisions with minimal guidance about the relevance
of readings to their own practices beyond education. They were also
expected (though not compelled) to share personal experiences with
other students in online discussions. Similarly, the “authentic” assessments
focused on students’ personal experiences. Thus, each student formed
the basis of her or his own legitimacy; as one teacher described: “What I
want to know is how much you, the student, can make the connections
between your beliefs and your theory, your beliefs and your practices and
can you share that with me and justify it”. However, this was not “any-
thing goes”—teachers valued a willingness to self-organise, participate and
share their experiences in online discussions. The ideal student by which
they measured work was thus independent, self-directed, confident and
reflective. In sum, the educational environment based legitimacy on spe-
cific dispositions of knowers: relatively strong social relations (SR+).

As Fig. 16.3 shows, the learning environments embodied weaker epis-
temic relations and stronger social relations or a knower code (ER–, SR+).
Thus, this position in the academic field devalorised capital based on spe-
cialised knowledge, skills and procedures and valorised capital based on
attributes of knowers. This knower-code position was empirically realised
as: curriculum downplaying content knowledge and valorising personal
experience; pedagogy downplaying teacher involvement in favour of self-
regulating learners creating their own understandings; and assessment
where knowers evaluate themselves based on personal rather than shared
criteria (Chen 2010, pp. 119–158).

Student Experience and Strategies

Students with knowledge-code dispositions occupying a knower-code
position creates the potential for a code clash. However, this is not to
say the students viewed the learning environment as a knower code. As
Bourdieu (2000) emphasised, one must avoid the “scholastic fallacy”
of confusing the outcome of conceptual analysis with the viewpoint of
participants. The experience of agents is mediated by the codes of their
habituses. In this case, the Chinese students viewed the environment not as a *knower code* but as a *relativist code* (ER–, SR–), one lacking any basis for legitimacy.

On the one hand, students’ characterisations of the learning environment embodied weaker epistemic relations but viewed negatively. They experienced latitude concerning curriculum knowledge as a lack of structure and viewed constructivist pedagogy as an absence of structured guidance with teachers acting as like “tour guides” or “passive assistants”. Almost all students expressed sentiments akin to the following:

I feel that teachers do not teach in online classes. They raise a lot of questions for us to discuss. What do they teach us? They teach us nothing. They ask us to think, but what if I can’t think of anything? I can sit there thinking all day, not sleeping at all, but I still can’t think of anything. So I don’t think they are teaching me.

Similarly, students described assessment criteria as lacking clarity and voiced frustration at being unable to obtain explicit instructions from teachers they approached for help.
On the other hand, students did not recognise the legitimacy of practices based on stronger social relations, such as sharing personal experience and peer discussion. They did not view their own experiences and beliefs as relevant to assignments and dismissed online discussions as “pointless” because other students were not experts in content knowledge. This was compounded by the hands-off approach of teachers; for example: “Even if I got a reply from my classmate, it’s unlikely that the teacher would post a message afterwards to confirm whether what my classmate said was correct or not”. Accordingly, none felt part of an online learning community, repeatedly expressing isolation and doubting whether they were learning at all.

As discussed above, students with knowledge-code habituses (ER+, SR–) were seeking stronger epistemic relations and predisposed to downplay social relations. When encountering knower-code learning environments (ER–, SR+), they were frustrated by the weaker epistemic relations and unable to see the stronger social relations, viewing self-disclosure and peer discussion as not legitimate. As depicted in Fig. 16.4, the Chinese students perceived the environment as embodying both weaker
epistemic relations and weaker social relations: a relativist code (ER–, SR–). This code was experienced as a vacuum and related by students to feeling inferior, insecure, anxious, frustrated, helpless, guilty and depressed (Chen 2010, pp. 159–209). In short, the students were like “fish out of water” because their habitus code not only clashed with the environment code but also rendered its rules of the game invisible, leaving them floundering.

The students were unable to simply repeat their previous learning strategies from China, for their assignments were fundamentally different. However, they continued following their knowledge-code habituses through strategies such as treating previously learned academic knowledge as personal experience and synthesising personal experiences from examples found in readings. In other words, they exhibited what Bourdieu (1984) termed “hysteresis”, whereby the habitus remains unchanged in new circumstances. Here, students’ coping strategies reflected their existing knowledge-code dispositions. This was not without cost: they described the courses and studying overseas as a waste of time and often blamed themselves for failing to discern the learning requirements.

CONCLUSION

Bourdieu argued that “the most vital task of social science … is to establish as a fundamental norm of scientific practice the conversion of thought, the revolution of the gaze, the rupture with the preconstructed” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, pp. 251–252). This revolution involves a shift to relational thinking that horizontally relates dispositions, positions and practices through vertically revealing their organising principles. In this chapter I argued that LCT offers concepts that complement Bourdieu’s tools in ways that embody this relational gaze. As the example above begins to illustrate, LCT enables analyses to reveal and relate the organising principles (the X) underlying the diverse phenomena denoted by habitus, field, capital, practice, etc. In this case, the study analysed the specialisation codes of student dispositions, teaching practices, student experiences, and student learning strategies. These codes were then related together to explain student experiences. The analysis conjectured that knowledge-code students (ER+, SR–) in knower-code environments (ER–, SR+) experience the weaker epistemic relations as an absence and do not see the stronger social relations as
legitimate, generating relativist-code experiences (ER−, SR−) which they negotiate by continuing knowledge-code practices, with damaging emotional and educational effects. Put another way, LCT can add codes to each element of Bourdieu’s formula “[(habitus)(capital)] + field = practice”. One can summarise this study’s findings as: knowledge-code (habitus and capital) + knower-code position = relativist-code experiences + knowledge-code strategies.

By using specialisation codes, the study was thereby able not only to argue that students felt like “fish out of water” but also to show the basis of that mismatch: a code clash between knowledge-code habituses and the knower-code environment. The study was also able to systematically show similarity or difference and, moreover, change between contexts and over time; for example, despite empirical differences between their learning strategies in China and Australia, analysis showed that students’ habituses exhibited hysteresis by maintaining a knowledge code.

As the study illustrates, code concepts are not locked onto habitus, field or capital but rather apply to all the phenomena highlighted by Bourdieu’s tools. Similarly, the conjectures they enable are not locked into specific contexts. In this case, the explanation encompasses all knowledge-code agents in all knower-code environments, regardless of location, social background, form of practice, etc. LCT thus provides a means for exploring potentially “general or invariant properties” of social fields. Moreover, using specialisation codes allows this conjecture to avoid the terms “Chinese”, “Western”, “Australian”, “constructivist”, etc., illustrating how LCT enables the “rupture” with pre-constructed categories essential to Bourdieu’s gaze.

Finally, by embodying relational thinking, LCT can propose new possibilities. The study suggests ways to avoid the code clash, such as teachers making explicit the code underlying success and modelling the knower-code practices required of students. Indeed, as a growing body of teaching practice shows, teachers can use LCT as an explicit meta-language for making the “rules of the game” visible to students (e.g. Clarence 2016; Kirk 2017).

LCT is far more than the concepts I have illustrated here, and these concepts are more complex than I have shown. Rather than simply an “X”, specialisation codes are a combination of settings of two principles, each of which can exhibit a range of strengths. There are four main specialisation codes, but each code can take many forms (Maton 2014). Moreover, there are four other species of legitimation code,
each revealing different dimensions of practice, such as temporality. Legitimation codes can embrace as much complexity as required by the object of study. Nonetheless, the example highlights how LCT can help fulfil the promise of field theory. By converting a relational gaze into relational concepts, the framework can enable others to complete that “mental revolution” required to practise what Bourdieu preached. LCT can help us think like Bourdieu.

NOTES

1. Bourdieu (1993) elsewhere described “the autonomous principle” and “the heteronomous principle”, but the X that underlies these dichotomous “principles” was not conceptualised. (Both this and degrees of distance from necessity have been conceptualised within LCT as “autonomy codes” and “semantic gravity”, respectively; Maton 2005, 2014).
2. For LCT research, see http://www.legitimationcodetheory.com.
3. All student and teacher quotes are from Chen (2010).
4. Analysis of teachers’ positions in the university field would help explain their adoption of constructivist stances, but that was not the focus of this study. The aim was to analyse the organising principles characterising their position to explain the experiences of Chinese students.

REFERENCES


